I am interested in adoption models for technology and business practices—especially for Bitcoin, the first decentralized debit platform to constitute a two-sided network.
To understand Bitcoin is to be passionate about the
blockchain and its potential for mitigating trust in a manner that is fair, transparent,
auditable and maintained. The blockchain demonstrates that in large
communities, trust is—and always has been—an exercise in distributed
bookkeeping.
I am the chief architect behind a privacy methodology that has been presented at Google headquarters and at university conferences [video].
How do “free” Internet services protect user privacy in an age of marketing, hacking and NSA vacuuming? How can they demonstrate to users that data is immune from snooping—even internally? Last summer, my work on establishing user trust was featured at the Université de Montréal Privacy Colloquium.
Conventional wisdom dictates that cloud data should be stored at a trusted data center with standards for privacy & security—and in a clearly identified jurisdiction. But convention is outdated. Distributed, peer-to-peer storage is more robust, less susceptible to hacking and—with private key user credentials—impossible to subpoena. With proper architecture (what I call “torrent reacquisition”), it can be fast and transparent.
A few cloud storage providers have baked-in my suggested architecture, but the fulll vision has yet to be adopted. I envision a combination of three novel twists on the existing model: a) A hubless, fully-distributed, P2P storage architecture (no data center); b) Reverse the model: Live cloud with Local/Physical backup); c) Torrent reacquisition to restore data.
The market and methods for specifying a network
storage architecture is highly fragmented. Decisions made regarding
network layout, and capital equipment will have repercussions into the
future. Which architecture is best for a given set of criteria. Which
technologies are durable for the long haul: RAID, fiber-bus, load
balancing, real-time encryption, hashing, peer matrices, etc. Should the
whole project be hosted by a virtual service? I am working toward a
Disclosure: I hold the patent. The
technology was commercialized Unlike traditional phone service, VOIP is an
unmetered pipe. Just as with email, a flat billing structure invites
SPIT (Spam over IT).
Sender risk
offers an elegant solution. Use economics to mitigate irrelevant messaging
between strangers. It’s new and very bold. Yet, implemented correctly,
it is transparent to both recipients and legitimate senders. What if everyone had their own “Personal Interrupt
Value”—calculated in real time based on the number of unrecognized
parties who seek to reach you, and how certain each caller is that you
really want to hear from them. Now, it gets interesting
Explore transparent and effective Sender Risk: |