Diminishing Bitcoin Mining Rewards

By now, most Bitcoin and Blockchain enthusiasts are aware of four looming issues that threaten the conversion of Bitcoin from an instrument of academics, criminal activity, and closed circle communities into a broader instrument that is fungible, private, stable, ubiquitous and recognized as a currency—and not just an investment unit or a transaction instrument.

These are the elephants in the room:

  • Unleashing high-volume and speedy transactions
  • Governance and the concentration of mining influence among pools, geography or special interests
  • Privacy & Anonymity
  • Dwindling mining incentives (and the eventual end of mining). Bitcoin’s design eventually drops financial incentives for transaction validation. What then?

As an Op-Ed pundit, I value original content. But the article, below, on Bitcoin fungibility, and this one on the post-incentive era, are a well-deserved nod to inspired thinking by other writers on issues that loom over the cryptocurrency community.

This article at Coinidol comes from an unlikely source: Jacob Okonya is a graduate student in Uganda. He is highly articulate, has a  keen sense of market economics and the evolution of technology adoption. He is also a quick study and a budding columnist.

What Happens When Bitcoin Mining Rewards Diminish To Zero?

Jacob addresses this last issue with clarity and focus. I urge Wild Ducks to read it. My response, below touches on both issues 3 and 4 in the impromptu list, above.


Sunset mining incentives—and also the absence of supporting fully anonymous transactions—are two serious deficiencies in Bitcoin today.
I am confident that both shortcomings will be successfully addressed and resolved.

Thoughts about Issues #3 and #4: [Disclosure] I sit on the board at CRYPSA and draft whitepapers and position statements.*

Blockchain Building: Dwindling Incentives

mining-incentive-02Financial incentives for miners can be replaced by non-financial awards, such as recognition, governance, gaming, stakeholder lotteries, and exchange reputation points. I am barely scratching the surface. Others will come up with more creative ideas.

Last year, at the 2015 MIT Bitcoin Expo, Keynote speaker Andreas Antonopoulos expressed confidence that Bitcoin will survive the sunset of miner incentives. He proposed some novel methods of ongoing validation incentives—most notably, a game theory replacement. Of course, another possibility is the use of very small transaction fees to continue financial incentives.

Personally, I doubt that direct financial incentives—in the form of microcash payments— will be needed. Ultimately, I envision an ecosystem in which everyone who uses Bitcoin to buy, sell, gift, trade, or invest will avoid fees while creating fluidity—by sharing the CPU burden. All users will validate at least one Blockchain transaction for every 5 transactions of their own.

Today, that burden is complex by design, because it reflects increasing competition to find a diminishing cache of unmined coins. But without that competition, the CPU overhead will be trivial. In fact, it seems likely that a validation mechanism could be built into every personal wallet and every mobile device app. The potential for massive crowd-sourced scrutiny has the added benefit of making the blockchain more robust: Trusted, speedy, and resistant to attack.

Transaction Privacy & Anonymity

Bitcoin’s lack of rock-solid, forensic-thwarting anonymity is a weak point that must ultimately be addressed. It’s not about helping criminals, it’s about liberty and freedoms. Detectives & forensic labs have classic methods of pursuing criminals. It is not our job to offer interlopers an identity, serial number and traceable event for every transaction.

Anonymity can come in one of three ways. Method #3 is least desirable:

  1. Add complex, multi-stage, multi-party mixing to every transaction—including random time delays, and parsing out fragments for real purchases and payments. To be successful, mixing must be ubiquitous. That is, it must be active with every wallet and every transaction by default. Ideally, it should even be applied to idle funds. This thwarts both forensic analysis mining-incentive-03and earnest but misguided attempts to create a registry of ‘tainted’ coins.
  2. Fork by consensus: Add anonymizing technology by copying a vetted, open source alt-coin
  3. Migrate to a new coin with robust, anonymizing tech at its core. To be effective, it must respect all BTC stakeholders with no other ownership, pre-mined or withheld distribution. Of course, it must be open, transparent and permissionless—with an opportunity and incentive for all users to be miners, or more specifically, to be bookkeepers.

That’s my opinion on the sunset of mining incentives and on transaction anonymity.
—What’s yours?


* Ellery Davies is co-chair of the Cryptocurrency Standards Asso-
  ciation. He was host and MC for the Bitcoin Event in New York.

Bitcoin Fungibility: A Benefit of privacy & anonymity

I was pointed to this article by Jon Matonis, Founding Director, Bitcoin Foundation. I was sufficiently moved to highlight it here at AWildDuck.

On Fungibility, Bitcoin, Monero and ZCash … [backup]

This is among the best general introductions I have come across on traceability and the false illusion of privacy. The explanation of coin mixing provides and coin_mixing-03excellent, quick & brief overview.

Regarding transaction privacy, a few alt-coins provide enhanced immunity or deniability from forensic analysis. But if your bet is on Bitcoin (as it must be), the future is headed toward super-mixing and wallet trading by desgin and by default. Just as the big email providers haved added secure transit,
Bitcoin will eventually be fully randomized and anonymized per trade and even when assets are idle. It’s not about criminals; it’s about protecting business, government and individuals. It’s about liberty and our freedoms. [Continue below image]

coin_mixing-04

How to thwart forensic investigation: Fogify explains an advanced mixing process

The next section of the article explains the danger of losing fungibility due to transaction tracing and blacklisting. I can see only ONE case for this, and it requires a consensus and a hard fork (preferably a consensus of ALL stakeholders and not just miners). For example, when a great number of Etherium was stolen during the DAO meltdown.

My partner, Manny Perez, and I take opposing views of blacklisting coins based on their ‘tainted’ history (according to “The Man”, of course!). I believe that blacklists must ultimately be rendered moot by ubiquitous mixing, random transaction-circuit delays, dilbert-060219and multiple-transaction ‘washing’ (intentionally invoking a term that legislators and forensic investigators hate)—Manny feels that there should be a “Law and Order” list of tainted coins. Last year, our Pro-&-Con views were published side-by-side in this whitepaper.

Finally, for Dogbert’s take on fungible, click here. I bought the domain fungible.net many years ago, and I still haven’t figured out what to do with it. Hence this Dilbert cartoon. 🙂
____________
The author is co-chair of The Cryptocurrency Standards Association.
He also presents on privacy, anonymity, blind signaling & antiforensics.

Blind Signaling and Response presentation posted

Online services mine personal user data to monetize processes. That’s the business model of “free” services. Even if mining is consensual, policies and promises cannot guaranty privacy. It succumbs to error, administrative malfeasance, hackers, malware and overreaching governments. Is there a technical solution? One that supports monetized data mining and manipulation, but only under predefined conditions, rather than by policies and promises?

Philip Raymond has spent the past 4 years searching for a privacy Holy Grail: The ability to facilitate data mining and manipulation in a way that protects user identity, restricts use to predefined purposes, and insulates results from other uses, even within the service that gathers and manipulates the data.

Prior to this week, there was scant public material on the Blind Signaling mechanism. A PowerPoint overview was accessible only by students at a few universities and the French mathematician who is donating resources to the project.

This week, Université de Montréal posted a live video presentation that steps through the BSR PowerPoint slides. It was filmed at a computer privacy workshop hosted by the university math and encryption departments. Master of Ceremonies, Gilles Brassard, is recognized as an inventor of quantum cryptography, along with his colleague, Charles Bennett. [Brief History of QC]

Blind Signaling and Response  by Philip Raymond…

I am often asked about the algorithm or technical trick that enables data to be decrypted or manipulated—only if the user intent is pure. That’s the whole point here, isn’t it! We claim that a system can be devised that restricts interpretation and use of personal data (and even identities of individual users who generate data), based on the intended use.

The cover pulls back near the end of the video. Unfortunately, I was rushed through key PowerPoint slides, because of poor timing, audience questions, and a lack of discipline. But, I will present my theories directly to your screen, if you are involved in custodial privacy of user data for any online service (Google, Yahoo, Bing, etc) or ISP, or upstream provider, or an Internet “fabric” service (for example, Akamai).

How it Works

The magic draws upon (and forms an offshoot of) Trusted Execution Technology [TXT], a means of attestation and authentication, closely related to security devices called Trusted Platform Modules. In this case, it is the purpose of execution that must be authenticated before data can be interpreted, correlated with users or manipulated.

Blind Signaling and Response is a combination of TXT with a multisig voting trust. If engineers implement a change to the processes through which data is manipulated (for example, within an ad-matching algorithm of Google Ad-Words), input data decryption keys will no longer work. When a programming change occurs, the process decryption keys must be regenerated by the voting trust, which is a panel of experts in different countries. They can be the same engineers who work for Google on the project, and of course they work within an employer NDA. But, they have an contractual and ethical imperative to the users. (In fact, they are elected by users). Additionally, their vote is—collectively—beyond the reach of any government. This results in some very interesting dynamics…

  1. The unique TXT-backed architecture gives the voting trust power to block process changes, if a proscribed fraction of members believes that user data is being disclosed or manipulated in conflict with user-disclosed terms and expectations. Members of the voting trust are bound by non-disclosure, but their vote and their ethical imperative is to the end user.
  2. Blind Signaling and Response does not interfere with the massively successful Google business model. It continues to rake in revenue for serving up relevant screen real-estate to users, and whatever else Google does to match users with markets.
  3. Yet, BSR yields two important benefits:
  • a) It thwarts hackers, internal spies, carelessness, and completely undermines the process of government subpoenas, court orders and National Security Letters. After all, the data is meaningless even to in-house engineers. It is meaningful only when it is being used in the way the end users were promised.
  • b) Such a baked-in process methodology can be demonstrably proved. Doing so can dramatically improve user perception and trust in an online service, especially a large collection of “free” services that amasses personal data on interests, behavior and personal activities. When user trust is strengthened, users are not only more likely to use the services, they are less likely to thwart free services via VPN, mixers or other anonymizers.

Incidentally, the idea to merge a TXT mechanism with a human factor (a geographically distributed voting trust accountable to end users) was first suggested by Steven Sprague (just hours before my presentation in the above video…I had been working on a very different method to achieve blind signalling). In addition to being insightful and lightning quick to absorb, process and advise, Steven is a Trusted Platform expert, director of Wave Systems and CEO of  Rivetz. Steven and I were classmates at Cornell University, but had never met nor heard of each other until our recent affiliation as advisers to The Cryptocurrency Standards Association.

To learn more about Blind Signaling and Response—or to help with the project—use the contact link at the top of this page. Let me know if you watched the Montreal video.

Disclosure: The inventor/presenter publishes this Wild Duck blog under the pen name, “Ellery”.

Ex-NSA Boss says FBI is Wrong on Encryption

What happens if the National Park Service fences off scenic lookout points at the Grand Canyon’s south rim near the head of the Bright Angel trail? Would it prevent the occasional suicide jumper? Not a chance. (The National Park Service tried this in the mid 1980s). People will either gore themselves on fences and posts or they will end their lives on the road in a high speed automobile, putting others at risk. Either way, tourists will be stuck with looking at the North Rim and the Colorado River through prison bars.

Let’s move from analogy to reality. What happens if you jam cell phone signals on tunnels and bridges. Will it stop a terrorist from remotely detonating a bomb? No. But it will certainly thwart efforts to get rescue and pursuit underway. And what about personal encryption?…

Gadgets and apps are finally building encryption into their wares by default. Does a locked-down iPhone or the technology that businesses use to secure trade secrets and plan strategy among colleagues enable criminals. Not even close. But if the FBI criminalizes encryption, they cripple the entire American economy. After all, the Genie is already out of the lamp.

Bear with me for just one more analogy (I’m still reaching for the right one): Criminalizing kitchen knives will make cooking impossible and the criminals will still have knives.

A Wild Duck has not previously linked to a media article. I am proud of our all-original content and clear statement of opinions. But in this case, I could not have said it better myself. (Actually, I have said it this all along: End-to-end encryption is a good thing for government, businesses and individuals alike. It is communications and storage empowerment.)

With this article, you will see that the former NSA director gets it. The current FBI director hasn’t a clue. Ah, well…That’s OK. Some concepts are subtle. For some politicians, an understanding of the practical, personal and sociological implications requires decades of exposure and post-facto reflection.

Memo to FBI director, Jim Comey: Get your head out of the sand and surround yourself with advisers who can explain cause and effect.


, Jan 13, 2016)encryption

Encryption protects everyone’s communications, including terrorists. The FBI director wants to undermine that. The ex-NSA director says that’s a terrible idea.

The FBI director wants the keys to your private conversations on your smartphone to keep terrorists from plotting secret attacks.

But on Tuesday, the former head of the U.S. National Security Agency…

Read the full article at CNN Money
http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/13/technology/nsa-michael-hayden-encryption/

Privacy –vs– Anonymity

My friend and business partner, Manny Perez holds elective office. As New York State politicians go, he is an all around decent guy! The first things colleagues and constituents notice about him is that he is ethical, principled, has a backbone, and is compassionate for the causes he believes in.

Manny wears other hats. In one role, he guides an ocean freighter as  founder and co-director of CRYPSA, the Cryptocurrency Standards Association. Manny-guitar-sWith the possible exceptions of Satoshi Nakamoto and Andreas Antonopoulos, Manny knows more about Bitcoin than anyone.

But Manny and I differ on the role of privacy and anonymity in financial dealings. While he is a privacy advocate, Manny sees anonymity —and especially civilian tools of anonymity—as a separate and potentially illegal concept. He is uneasy about even discussing the use of intentionally architected anonymity in any financial or communications network. He fears that our phone conversation may be parsed (I agree) and trigger a human review (I agree) and that it could be construed as evidence of promoting illegal technology. This is where we differ… I agree, but I don’t care how anyone who is not party to a private conversation construes it! Yet, I see anonymity as either synonymous with privacy or at least a constituent component. You can’t have one without the other.

Manny was raised in Venezuela, where he was schooled and held is first jobs. He was involved in the energy industry. He acknowledges that experience with a repressive and graft-prone government, lead to a belief in a more open approach: free markets coupled with a democratic government.

Perhaps this is a key source of our different viewpoints. Manny comes from a repressive land and has come to respect the rules-based structure within his comfort zones of banking, energy and government. He is a certified AML expert (anti-money laundering) and believes strongly in other financial oversight rules, like KYC (Know Your Customer) and RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).

Because Manny is appreciative of the opportunity and benefits conveyed by his adoptive country, he may overlook a fact that whispers in the minds of other privacy advocates: That is, we may one day need protection from our own government. After all, who but a conspiracy nut or white supremacist could imagine the US government suppressing its populace. Sure, they engage in a little domestic spying—but if you have nothing to hide, why hide at all?!

This week, Manny posted an open letter to the cryptocurrency community. His organization, CRYPSA is at the intersection of that community with law, technology and politics. His letter addresses privacy, anonymity and transparency, but the title is “How can you report a stolen bitcoin?” For me, the issue is a non-sequitur. You needn’t, you shouldn’t, the reporting superstructure shouldn’t exist, and in a well designed system, you can’t.* More to the point, the imposition of any centralized reporting or recording structure would violate the principles of a decentralized, p2p currency.

To be fair, Manny is not a sheep, blindly falling into line. He is shrewd, independent and very bright. But in response to my exaggerated and one-dimensional Manny, I have assembled some thoughts…

1. Privacy, Anonymity and Crime

Bitcoin pile-sThe debate about Bitcoin serving as a laundering mechanism for cyber-criminals is a red herring. Bitcoin does not significantly advance the art of obfuscation or anonymity. There have long been digital E-golds and stored value debit cards that offer immunity from tracking. They are just as easy to use over the Internet.

Moreover, it’s common for crime or vice to drive the early adoption of new technology, especially technology that ushers in a paradigm shift. The problem with linking Bitcoin to crime is that it drives a related debate on transparency, forensics and government oversight. This is a bad association. Transparency should be exclusively elective, being triggered only after a transaction—if and when one party seeks to prove that a payment was made or has a need to discuss a contractual term.

On the other hand, a good mechanism should render forensic analysis a futile effort if attempted by a 3rd party without consent of the parties to a transaction. We should always resist the temptation to build a “snitch” into our own tools. Such designs ultimately defeat their own purpose. They do not help to control crime—Rather, they encourage an invasive government with its fingers in too many people’s private affairs.

CRYPSA is building tools that allow Bitcoin users to ensure that both parties can uncover a transaction completely, but only a party to the transaction wishes to do so!. For example, a parent making a tuition payment to a college can prove the date, amount and courses associated with that payment; a trucker or salesman with a daily expense account can demonstrate to his employer that a purchase was associated with food and lodging and not with souvenirs. And, of course, a taxpayer under audit can demonstrate whatever he wishes about each receipt or payment.

But in every case, the transaction is opaque (and if properly secured, it is completely anonymous) until the sender or recipient chooses to expose details to scrutiny. I will never accept that anonymity is evil nor evidence of illicit intent. Privacy is a basic tenet of a democracy and a government responsible to its citizens. CRYPSA develops tools of transparency, because commerce, businesses and consumers often need to invoke transparency—and not because any entity demands it of them.

We are not required to place our telephone conversations on a public server for future analysis (even if our government saves the metadata or the complete conversation to its clandestine servers). Likewise, we should not expose our transactions to interlopers, no matter their interest or authority. The data should be private until the data generator decides to make it public.

2. Reporting a Transaction (Why not catalog tainted coins?)

Manny also wants to aid in the serialization and cataloging of tainted funds, much like governments do with mass movement of cash into and out of the banking network. This stems from an earnest desire is to help citizens, and not to spy. For example, it seems reasonable that a mechanism to report the theft of currency should be embedded into Bitcoin technology. Perhaps the stolen funds can be more easily identified if digital coins themselves (or their transaction descendants) are fingered as rogue.

The desire to imbue government with the ability to trace the movement of wealth or corporate assets is a natural one. It is an outgrowth of outdated monetary controls and our comfort with centralized trust-endowed. In fact, it is not even a necessary requirement in levying or enforcing taxes.

Look at it this way…

  1. Bitcoin transactions are irreversible without the identification and cooperation of the original payee (the one who received funds). Of course, identification is not a requisite for making a transaction, any more than identification is required for a cash purchase at a restaurant or a newsstand.
  2. There are all sorts of benefits of both anonymous transactions and secure, irrevocable transactions—or least those that cannot be reversed without the consent of the payee. This is one of the key reasons that Bitcoin is taking off despite the start-up fluctuations in exchange rate.
  3. Regarding the concern that senders occasionally wish to reverse a transaction (it was mistaken, unauthorized, or buyer’s remorse), the effort to report, reverse or rescind a transaction is very definitely barking up the wrong tree!

The solution to improper transactions is actually quite simple.

a) Unauthorized Transactions

Harden the system and educate users. Unauthorized transactions can be prevented BEFORE they happen. Even in the worst case, your money will be safer than paper bills in your back pocket, or even than an account balance at your local bank.

b) Buyer’s Remorse and Mistaken transactions

Buyer beware. Think before you reach for your wallet! Think about what you are buying, from whom, and how you came to know them. And here is something else to think about (issues that are being addressed by CRYPSA)…

i.   Do you trust that the product will be shipped?
ii.  Did you bind your purchase to verifiable terms or conditions?
iii. Is a third party guarantor involved (like Amazon or eBay)?

All of these things are available to Bitcoin buyers, if they only educate themselves. In conclusion, “reporting” transactions that you wish to rescind is a red herring. It goes against a key tenant of cryptocurrency. It is certainly possible that a distributed reverse revocation mechanism can be created and implemented. But if this happens, users will migrate to another platform (call it Bitcoin 2.0).

You cannot dictate oversight, rescission or rules to that which has come about from organic tenacity. Instead, we should focus on implementing tools that help buyers and businesses identify sellers who agree to these extensions up front. This, again, is what CRYPSA is doing. It is championing tools that link a transaction to business standards and to user selective transparency. That is, a transaction is transparent if—and only if— the parties to a transaction agree to play by these rules, and if one of them decides to trigger the transparency. For all other p2p transactions, there is no plan to tame the Wild West. It is what it is.

* When I say that you should not report a stolen coin, I really mean that you should not run to the authorities, because there is nothing that they can do. But this is not completely accurate.

20130529_102314a1. There are mechanisms that can announce your theft back into a web of trust. Such a mechanism is at the heart of the certificate revocation method used by the encryption tool, PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). CRYPSA plans to design a similar user-reporting mechanism to make the cryptocurrency community safer.

2. Authorities should still be alerted to theft or misuse of assets. They can still investigate a crime scene, and follow a money trail in the same way that they do with cash transactions, embezzlement or property theft. They can search for motive and opportunity. They have tools and resources and they are professionals at recovering assets.


 

Disclosure: Just like Manny, I am also a CRYPSA director and acting Co-Chairman. (Cryptocurrency Standards Association). This post reflects my personal opinion on the issue of “reporting” unintended, unauthorized or remorseful transactions. I do not speak for other officers or members.

Canary Watch deduces federal gag orders

The US government and its courts routinely demand personal user information from email services, banks, phone companies and other online, telecommunications or financial services. These demands compel services to disclose details about email, phone calls and financial transactions. They also gain access to hordes of so called “metadata”, which can be just as personal as a user’s phone calls. It includes information about user relationships, locations, browser configuration and even search history. Many of these demands, such as the infamous National Security Letter stipulate that the service may not divulge that they were asked for the information in the first place. In fact, they can’t say anything about a de facto investigation!…

My friend, Michael, occasionally points out that skirting the law with Wink-Wink-Nod-Nod is still likely breaking the law. His point, of course, is that law is often based on intent. So with this in mind, what do you think about this clever reporting service?…

Canary WatchA service called, Canary Watch, lets online services like Verizon or Google send a continuous stream of data that repeatedly states “We are not currently compelled to turn over any data on our users”. Naturally, if the service suddenly refrains from sending the statement, a reasonable person can infer that the government is demanding personal information with the usual GAG order attached.

If you extrapolate this technique, a service like Verizon could continuously broadcast a massive list of usernames (or shorter hash codes representing individual users). These are the users who are not currently being investigated. Any change to the data stream would allow a 3rd party to infer and alert users who are the subject of an investigation.

With the launch of this service, Canary Watch wins the 2015 Wild Duck Privacy Award. This is the type of cleverness that we like! Why? Because it enhances transparency and helps everyone to control their own privacy, if they choose to do so.

Wild Duck Privacy Award

Further reading: Activists create website to track & reveal NSA, FBI info requests

Erase Online Infamy: Lies, slander, binging, sexting

I wrote this article under contract to the leading European security magazine and Blog, at which I typically write under my real name. (Ellery is a pen name).

Upon submission, my editor haggled over the usual issues of regional euphemisms (not allowed), eclectic metaphors (encouraged) and brevity (my submissions tend exceed the word limit by 3 or 4x). But this time, she also asked me to cut a section that I feel is critical to the overall thrust. That section is titled “Create Digital Chaff”

I am neither a stakeholder nor an editor at that magazine. Their editors have every right to set the terms and tone of anything they publish. But sensing my qualms over personal ethics and reputation, my editor released the article from contract and suggested that I publish in a venue with an edgy approach to privacy. I considered farming it out to Wired, CNet or PC Magazine, but it was written at a level and style intended for a very different audience. And so, it appears here, in my own Blog. The controversial section is intact and in red, below. Of course, Wild Ducks will see nothing controversial in a perfectly logical recommendation.

———————————————————————————————

The web is filled with tutorials on how to block tracking, hide purchases and credit history—even how to shift your identity deep under­cover.

But what about search results linked to your name, organization or your past. What can be done?

Legal remedies are rarely effective. The Internet is untamed. Data spreads like wildfire and it’s difficult to separ­ate opinion from slander. But, you can counter undesir­able content.

Catalogue the Irritants

Start by listing and prioritizing your pain. Search your name in all the ways you are known. Try several search engines, not just Google. Check image results and Usenet (news groups).

Record disparaging search results in 7 columns:

  • Search terms that yield the offending page
  • URL                       address of unflattering material
  • Severity                 damage to your reputation
  • Owner or Author   contact info of traceable party
  • Which role?           author, site admin, hosting service?
  • Inbound links         search on “Links:{Page_URL}”
  • Disposition             left msg, success, failure, etc

Sort pages in descending order of severity. As you resolve issues, reduce severity to zero, but save entries for follow up. With just a few offensive pages, it may take a few hours to perform the tasks described.

The Process

Most posts boil down to an individual author rather than a faceless organization. You can appeal, bargain, redirect, bury or dis­credit a source, sometimes employing several strategies. With reputation is at stake, all is fair.

Removing or Correcting Content

First, determine if you are more likely to influence the web developer, site host, or author who cre­ated unflat­tering mater­ial (start with him, if pos­sible).

Ascertain if the author is likely to influence readers that matter to you. After all, without creed, rants cannot Infamy Callout 1ado much damage.

If the source is credible, appeal directly. In some cases, re­marks about you may be immaterial to his point. If it is impos­sible to find the source or if there is no meeting of minds, con­tact the site owner or hosting service—daunting, but not im­possible. GoDaddy, the largest host­ing site[1], often takes down entire sites in response to complaints.

Try pleading, bargaining or swapping favors. (But never pay! Extortion is best handled by courts). Negotiate these actions:

  • Change names, keywords and metatags. Avoid taking down the page for 2 weeks.
  • Point domain or URL to a different site
  • Post an apology or correction at searchable pages that contain offending material. (Avoid describing the slander. Use different phrases).
  • Add chaff (below). It reduces discovery.

Takedown the Search Cache

Check the page cache of each search (click the arrow to the right of Google results). File takedown requests, especially if material is obscene or you can argue it is untruthful or slander.

Check referring sites. They may excerpt or echo defamation. In the UK, freedom of expression is becoming a gray area. Nevertheless, in practice, the Internet gives everyone a soap box. So our next technique employs misdirection and ‘noise’ rather than confrontation.

Create Digital Chaff

To protect from missiles, some aircraft eject ‘chaff’. The burning strips of foil lure guided munitions by presenting a target that is more attractive than the plane. Likewise, you can de­ploy digital “chaff” by planting information Infamy Callout 2that overwhelms search results, leading viewers away from de­famatory links via redirection or con­fusion. Your goal: change search result ranking.

Chaff-s

US Air Force jet ejects burning chaff

Consider photos or events that you find untruthful or embar­rassing. Ask friends with popular web pages to add content about the photo associating ficti­tious names (not yours). Con­versely, get them to post your name in articles that dis­tance you from the activity in ways that seemingly make it impossible for you to fit the offensive descriptions.

Use your imagination, but don’t make up lies. Eventually, they catch up with you. Instead, fill the web with news, trivia, reviews, and all things positive. Create content that pulls the focus of searches that previously led to pages you wish to suppress.

Finally, avoid SEO tricks to lure search engines,[2] such as cross-links, robot-generated hits or invisible text and meta­data not directly related to con­tent. Infamy Callout 3Search engines de­tect rigging. Manip­ula­tion or deceit will de­mote your page rank, negating hours of hard work.

Looking forward, consider ways to avoid letting your own data lead to future embarrassment…

Social Media

Facebook isn’t the only social media site. They include any site with ‘walls’, feeds or link sharing. Likewise, Blogs and Blog comments create a threat beacon.

Social media can ruin reputations as surely as it shares photos and connects friends. Searchable from within and outside, they spread online activities like vines. Your wall and timeline will easily outlive you!

Learn privacy controls. Start by enabling all restrictions and then isolate friends and colleagues into circles. This partitions friends and colleagues into venues asso­ciated with your various hats. Of course, friends can be in several of your circles, but it gives you the ability to restrict your wall or photos to individuals likely to appreci­ate the context and less likely to amplify your accidents and oversights.

Faced with privacy concerns, Facebook recently added granular controls and Google unified privacy policies across services. Most sites offer ways to enable and disable features or even temporarily suspend tracking. If yours doesn’t, find a more reputable service.

Scrutinize, photo tagging options. Facebook users can block tagging of photos and remove their name on photos that others post. (Don’t take too much comfort—They also use facial rec­ognition to encourage other users to ID you. In the universe of photos that include you, only a fraction was posted by you.)

Clean up Cloud Services

Do you use iCloud, Google Drive, or Skydrive? Infamy Callout 4How about Dropbox, SugarSync or backup services Carbonite or Mozy?

Cloud services are great collaboration tools. They backup folders and stream personal media. Like social networks, they present another leaky conduit for your private life.

Check that sync folders are encrypted or unlikely to convey personal or unflattering material. Review shared links: Never grant access to everyone or let anyone access everything. Administer your friends, family and colleagues on a need-to-know basis. Your data needs a defense perimeter.

Create an Alter Ego

Ellery isn’t my real name. It is the alias with which I publish AWildDuck. But the fact that I acknowledge that I have another identity and occasional references to my career, geographic location and age, demonstrates that I am either very foolish or not making a serious effort to prevent discovery.

Archival Sites

Unfortunate news for anyone trying to erase history: The Wayback Machine at www.archive.org takes snapshots of the entire Internet every day. Visi­tors click a calendar to travel back in time and view a web or page as it once appeared.

Al­though content does not appear in search results, the com­ments you posted about the boss’ daughter are viewable to any visitor—no login required! Advice concerning archive sites: “Get past it!” They are not likely a threat, but they remind us that in the Internet Age, history cannot be erased.

A Dose of Prevention

Putting anything online—even email—lets a cat out of a bag. You can corral it and hope that it doesn’t eat the neigh­bor’s daisies, but you cannot get it back into the bag. That’s why we focus on disguise, chaff and misdirection. If the neighbors are looking at your shiny car and the cat looks more like a dog belonging to someone else, it is less likely to draw attention.

As you hunt authors of unflattering detritus and imple­ment containment, make a resolution to watch what you say online. Online content is never private. Cameras and recorders are everywhere and they aren’t operated by friends. Your trail will easily outlive you.

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[1] In April 2005, Go Daddy (aka Wild West Domains) surpassed Network Solutions as the largest ICANN-accredited registrar on the Internet [domain names registered].
Source: web-hosting-top.com. Stats of 4/27/2005, and up to the date of this posting.

[2] SEO = Search Engine Optimization